Genuine questions.
What’s up with China’s history of backing reactionary forces and siding with the us against socialist countries/projects?
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Why did China back and support the Khmer Rouge alongside the US to fight Vietnam?
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Why did China back and support the Mujahadeen alongside the US to fight the communists of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union?
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Why did China back and support the FNLA and UNITA alongside the US to fight the MPLA and the Cubans in Angola?
I’m fairly ignorant of all these so I’m asking for clarification on the subjects as well as personal opinions.
The Sino-Soviet Split was fucking stupid, basically.
Like, the Chinese were correct that the USSR was making revisionist changes that would prove detrimental to its long term survival. But the hostile foreign policy that China took towards the USSR was also a huge fucking problem.
They could have easily sided with the USSR in foreign policy matters, and viewing them as an wayward Socialist project, still worth supporting against Imperialist aggression. But they didn’t do that. And in many ways we’re still living with the consequences.
It’s a big part of why modern Chinese foreign policy is so cautious.
While the Sino-Soviet split was a tragedy for the international communist movement, framing it as a mere “stupid” policy error overlooks the material contradictions that made unity so difficult. The core of the matter was not simply a disagreement over economic theory, but a fundamental divergence in how the Soviet Union approached other socialist projects. From the post-Stalin era under Khrushchev onward, it became clear that Moscow increasingly viewed fraternal parties as subordinate satellites rather than sovereign equals.
Moscow increasingly viewed fraternal parties as subordinate satellites rather than sovereign equals.
while these frustrations were sadly indeed not without cause, it is also important to understand the soviet government’s perspective:
moscow increasingly came to perceive beijing’s behaviour as demanding preferential treatment, with it being very understandably reluctant to abet what it viewed as china’s extremely reckless and maximalist policy of the time, such as the taiwan strait crisis and the border war with india. there were concerns that the cpc wanted the soviet military to act as its muscle unconditionally and with zero consideration for repercussions or possible threats to soviet national security.
regarded as similarly unreasonable were the demands made towards soviet technical specialists, who had been provided to the country on extremely favourable terms, despite the ussr itself being in dire need of reconstruction and suffering from acute labour shortages. complaining about “soviet opportunism” while surviving off soviet food aid and berating the ussr for insufficiently confronting the class enemy while making backroom deals with that very same class enemy is certainly a way to go about things.
also, similar frustrations with the soviet union’s attitude towards them were voiced by countries like poland and românia, but neither went on to collaborate as extensively with the west, and especially america. not even yugoslavia did.
Both sides did indeed act with incomplete information, and the Soviet Union’s security anxieties made sense. China’s mistakes are also undeniable. However, several key facts must be addressed:
Moscow increasingly came to perceive Beijing’s behavior as demanding preferential treatment… there were concerns that the CCP wanted the Soviet military to act as its muscle unconditionally and with zero consideration for repercussions or possible threats to Soviet national security.
The facts are quite the opposite. In 1958, Moscow proposed jointly building a longwave radio station with an investment of 110 million rubles, of which the Soviet Union contributed 70 million, and the station would be jointly used after completion. Mao Zedong’s reply was that China would bear all the costs and own all the rights. Then with the “Joint Fleet,” he directly criticized the Soviet Union “They want control, they want lease rights”. What Beijing rejected was precisely the borrowing of others muscle and the control that accompanied it. The shelling of Kinmen in the same year further illustrates the point: China neither consulted nor notified the Soviet Union before the shelling. On the eve of Gromyko’s secret visit to China, Zhou Enlai clearly stated to the Soviet side that China would bear the consequences of any trouble that ensued, “not dragging the Soviet Union into the fray”. A country that wants to use its allies as “muscle” will not take major military action without informing its allies while making commitments to not involve them.
…what it viewed as China’s extremely reckless and maximalist policy of the time, such as the Taiwan Strait crisis and the border war with India.
The shelling of Kinmen was a continuation of the Chinese civil war, an unfinished task concerning sovereignty and territorial integrity. If this is considered “maximalist policy,” then wouldn’t it also be considered “maximalist policy” of the Soviet Union to drive the White Army and foreign interventionist forces out of its borders? What truly stung Beijing was Moscow’s subsequent accusations against China, which was tantamount to demanding a veto over the process of the Chinese revolution. Regarding the Sino-Indian border issue in 1962, Moscow, on the one hand, had Pravda publish an editorial on October 25th openly supporting China (at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, needing Beijing’s support), and on the other hand, delivered or supplied India with 94 aircraft, including MiG-21s, between 1960 and 1962. What Beijing saw was not being “dragged into the water,” but rather Moscow hedging its bets on the Sino-Indian conflict.
The demands made towards Soviet technical specialists, who had been provided to the country on extremely favorable terms, were regarded as similarly unreasonable, while complaining about “Soviet opportunism” and surviving off Soviet food aid.
Aid does not exempt one from criticism, much less is it a blank check to unilaterally add conditions and demand concessions. On July 16, 1960, the Soviet Union unilaterally issued a note, withdrawing all 1,390 experts within a little over a month. Soviet experts were distributed in more than 250 enterprises and departments such as domestic economy, defense, cultural education and scientific research. When they retreated, they took away all the drawings, plans and materials, bringing the construction projects of a large number of Chinese enterprises and institutions to a standstill, causing great losses and extremely difficult times, In the nuclear industry, the Soviet side completely broke the contract, withdrew the experts, and took away the drawings and materials, as early as June 1959, it refused to provide atomic bomb samples, hence the code name “596” for China’s first atomic bomb project. This was at the most vulnerable moment for the Chinese economy, turning technological dependence into a tool of political coercion. The same applies to debt: the main body is trade debt incurred due to the inability to deliver goods on time after the Great Leap Forward; the claim of “Soviet pressure for debt” has no archival basis, yet China still decided to repay it ahead of schedule; even during famine years, China still exported agricultural products to the Soviet Union to repay its debts. The combination of “living off Soviet food aid while simultaneously criticizing opportunism” is invalid.
…berating the USSR for insufficiently confronting the class enemy while making backroom deals with that very same class enemy is certainly a way to go about things.
This is compressing the causal chain of three eras into a single “hypocrisy.” The criticism of “peaceful coexistence” originated in the Mao Zedong era of the 1960s; the Sino-US détente was a decision made in 1972, directly triggered by the Zhenbao Island conflict of 1969 and the subsequent Soviet troop buildup, resulting in a million-strong army on the border; as for comprehensive economic cooperation with the West, that came much later with the reform and opening up.
Also, similar frustrations… were voiced by countries like Poland and Rome, but neither went on to collaborate as extensively with the West, and especially America. Not even Yugoslavia did.
This is a factual error. After the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict in 1948, Yugoslavia received substantial aid, loans, and military assistance from the United States, while simultaneously pursuing a non-aligned stance; In 1968, Romania refused to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and a rally of 100,000 people was held in Bucharest to publicly condemn the Soviet Union, after which its economic and trade relations with the West rapidly deepened.
Regarding the Sino-Indian border issue in 1962, Moscow, on the one hand, had Pravda publish an editorial on October 25th openly supporting China (at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, needing Beijing’s support), and on the other hand, delivered or supplied India with 94 aircraft, including MiG-21s, between 1960 and 1962. What Beijing saw was not being “dragged into the water,” but rather Moscow hedging its bets on the Sino-Indian conflict.
USSR didn’t only support China in editorials.
Here’s 14th October USSR Presidium decision to:
- Halt delivery of MIG-21 planes to India
- Write to India and let Nehru know USSR is disappointed, remind him McMahon Line is a legacy of British colonialism and that conditions have changed, and suggest India is not likely to gain anything from this conflict.
The letter was drafted on the 17th October, read it yourself - it’s cautiously worded but in between repeated calls for a peaceful resolution, USSR clearly supports China on every single point.
China launched its offensive on 20th October.
Here’s 22 October USSR statement to Beijing, explaining so far they only supplied India eight AH-12 airplanes and twenty MU‑4 helicopters which had no military significance, expressing fraternal friendship, and supporting China’s claim that McMahon Line is not an established boundary but a painful historical legacy.
USSR resumed delivery of MIGs to India after China achieved its goals and the war ended.
first of all thank you for the reply and for all the links, appreciate them.
i’ll have to disagree on a few key points, however:
A country that wants to use its allies as “muscle” will not take major military action without informing its allies while making commitments to not involve them.
the escalation actively risked china stepping into war with the americans, while the 1955 treaty bound the ussr to providing mutual assistance. moscow feared that beijing’s promises not to involve them would turn out unkeepable, suspecting that they were only made to keep them from blocking the action.
there were reasonable concerns that, if presented with a fait accompli, the ussr would end up unable to prevent circumstances from drawing them in.
also, the bolsheviks were very much familiar with the experience of losing territory and having to make unpleasant compromises, the treaty of brest-litovsk being one of many examples. and ultimately, the cpc did end up stepping away from the military approach to reunification, didn’t it?
Moscow […] delivered or supplied India with 94 aircraft, including MiG-21s, between 1960 and 1962.
the key distinction is that moscow had agreed in 1961 to supply india with mig-21s, before the sino-indian war began. the deal was not a wartime emergency shipment and after fighting began, the ussr temporarily suspended it while trying to manage relations with both sides. only after the war and the cuban missile crisis was it resumed.
re: specialists
soviet personnel taking the fruits of their labour with them, after they were no longer obligated to provide them for free, was to be expected, and in the face of increasingly open hostility also a matter of operational security. for what it matters, chinese leaders had already expressed dissatisfaction with the presence of soviet specialists in 1956 and again in 1958, but when the soviet side proposed removing them, the chinese suddenly asked that they stay…
million-strong army on the border
that army didn’t come out of nothing, did it? china was behaving aggressively by staging unprovoked attacks on soviet territory, and moscow was reacting to chinese troops crossing the border and killing soviet personnel. china was also actively aiding the cia by helping them build anti-soviet espionage stations in northern china (project chestnut), with deng even receiving an exclusive tour of langley.
re: yugoslavia and românia
i’m sorry, but imho it’s undeniable that china had a greater anti-soviet impact overall than yugoslavia, not to mention bucharest.
besides the things mentioned before, which forced the ussr to devote substantial attention and military resources to its border with china, it also needs to be mentioned, that from the sino-soviet split onwards, china was consistently giving material support to pretty much every anti-soviet force there was, including extremely reactionary ones, like the khmer rouge, nicaraguan contras, the unita puppets of apartheid south africa, afghan reactionary drug lords, the régime of siad barre, mobutu’s zaïre, the greek military junta, the dictatorships of augusto pinochet in chile or yahya khan in pakistan, etc., etc…
belgrade had already reasonably normalised its ties with moscow by 1955, while beijing kept exhibiting extreme enmity up until the late perestroika era.
it’s undeniable that china had a greater anti-soviet impact overall than yugoslavia… china was consistently giving material support to pretty much every anti-soviet force… khmer rouge, nicaraguan contras, unita… belgrade had already reasonably normalised its ties with moscow by 1955, while beijing kept exhibiting extreme enmity up until the late perestroika era.
First, another serious factual error: China did not support the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary forces (the Contras). On December 7, 1985, China established diplomatic relations with the Sandinista government.
I acknowledge the costs: the “One Line” strategy of the 1970s did indeed lead China to align itself with several reactionary regimes, including Mobutu, Siad Barre, and Yahya Khan. Supporting the Khmer Rouge was an especially serious mistake.
China itself adjusted its “One Line” strategy at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982.
However, we must distinguish between establishing diplomatic relations and providing material support. Maintaining diplomatic relations with the Greek military junta, or retaining relations with Chile following the coup, was part of normal interstate relations. It did not automatically mean “supporting dictatorship.” The Soviet Union likewise maintained close relations with Pahlavi-era Iran, the Argentine military junta, and other such regimes.
China’s “anti-Soviet impact was greater” while true aon the surface is simply a reflection of the difference in scale of the nation. For example after normalizing relations in 1955, Belgrade continued receiving American aid and pursued the Non-Aligned Movement. Following 1968, it also rearmed.
Both sides acted with incomplete information, and China made mistakes of its own. There is no need to deny that.
But the consistent principle throughout was this: an alliance must not come at the expense of sovereignty, and assistance does not purchase the right to exercise control.
the escalation actively risked china stepping into war with the americans, while the 1955 treaty bound the ussr to providing mutual assistance… the bolsheviks were very much familiar with… brest-litovsk… and ultimately, the cpc did end up stepping away from the military approach to reunification, didn’t it?
That was the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, not 1955. The claim that the bombardment “recklessly risked war with the United States” is inconsistent with the facts. Mao Zedong explicitly instructed that “only Chiang’s ships should be attacked, not American ships”, and specifically asked beforehand whether it was possible to avoid hitting Americans.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk actually demonstrates the very principle you are trying to refute: it was a sovereign decision made by the Soviets themselves. No external “authority” had the right to force or veto it. By the same logic, when China chooses to fight and when it chooses to negotiate are decisions belonging to the Chinese people themselves.
In 1979, China voluntarily ceased the bombardment and published the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, proposing peaceful reunification. This was still an autonomous decision within the scope of Chinese sovereignty. The Soviet Union’s concern about being dragged into a war through faits accomplis is understandable from the perspective of alliance management. But the solution was not demanding authority over Chinese sovereignty.
the key distinction is that moscow had agreed in 1961 to supply india with mig-21s, before the sino-indian war began… the ussr temporarily suspended it… only after the war and the cuban missile crisis was it resumed.
The timeline is broadly correct, and I acknowledge that, but the year is wrong: the Soviet-Indian aircraft agreement was signed on August 29, 1962, not 1961. The Soviet Union did indeed suspend MiG-21 deliveries during the war however Mig’s were only a single part of the equation.
On October 11 and 14, the CPSU Presidium decided to support China but deliberately kept this support secret, on the grounds that they “could not push Nehru into America’s camp.” On October 25, Pravda publicly supported China, but only because Moscow needed Beijing’s support during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Once the crisis ended on October 28, the Soviet Union returned to “neutrality” by November 5.
Furthermore, even while suspending MiG-21 deliveries, the Soviet Union continued to deliver An-12 transport aircraft and Mi-4 helicopters to India under existing contracts.
The issue was not “emergency wartime deliveries” per say it was that the Soviet Union treating China’s territorial disputes as leverage in its relations with India.
soviet personnel taking the fruits of their labour with them, after they were no longer obligated to provide them for free, was to be expected… chinese leaders had already expressed dissatisfaction… but when the soviet side proposed removing them, the chinese suddenly asked that they stay…
I acknowledge that Chinese leaders had already stated in On the Ten Major Relationships (1956) that Soviet experience “must be studied critically, not blindly.” They were indeed dissatisfied with the great-power attitude of some Soviet experts. The Chinese side also genuinely wanted the experts to stay in 1960.
But “wanting them to stay” meant asking the Soviet Union to fulfill it’s unfinished contracts. The sudden shutdown of 155 ongoing projects was a disaster.
The argument that the Soviet Union was “no longer obligated” does not hold especially in the case of the nuclear industry. The October 15, 1957 Agreement on New Defense Technology explicitly stipulated that the Soviet Union would provide China with an atomic bomb instructional model, blueprints, and technical documentation. In June 1959, the Soviet side unilaterally reneged on this agreement. This was the repudiation of a signed agreement, not the expiration of an obligation.
The experts took away and destroyed the fruits of joint labor by Chinese and Soviet personnel, not merely “the fruits of their own labor.” Taking one’s personal notes home is one thing destroying joint work is quite another.
Throughout your argument, you treat aid as a bargaining chip. That is precisely the problem: providing assistance does not confer rights of control beyond the terms originally agreed upon.
China paid for the assistance it received (including weapons supplied at half price during the Korean War and repayment through trade), and repaid its debts ahead of schedule.
that army didn’t come out of nothing, did it? china was behaving aggressively by staging unprovoked attacks on soviet territory… project chestnut… deng even receiving an exclusive tour of langley.
I acknowledge that, according to Li Danhui’s research, the first clash on March 2 involved the Chinese side firing first.
However, the claim that China “launched an unprovoked attack on Soviet territory” is incorrect. Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island) lies on China’s side of the main river channel. During the 1964 negotiations, the Soviet side had already agreed that it belonged to China. Its status as Chinese territory was subsequently reconfirmed by the 1991 Sino-Soviet Agreement on the Eastern Section of the Sino-Soviet Boundary. This was a counterattack on Chinese territory.
The attack was preceded by years of escalating Soviet provocations. Between October 1964 and March 1969, there were more than 4,160 border incidents. Soviet armored vehicles ran over Chinese civilians living along the border, and Soviet troops fired warning shots at Chinese patrols.
The argument that “the army didn’t come out of nowhere” actually reverses the chronology. The million-strong Soviet troop deployment began after the 1966 Soviet-Mongolian military alliance treaty, before 1969. After the clashes, the Soviet Union also issued threats of a “surgical nuclear strike”. On August 13, Soviet forces annihilated an entire Chinese patrol unit at Tielieketi.
The existence of the “Project Chestnut” listening station is indeed true. However, it took place more than a decade later.
Using cooperation in 1979 to retroactively justify the withdrawal of experts in 1960 and the deployment of troops along the border in 1969 is yet another reversal of cause and effect.
And the way many Socialists today speak of other socialists with mildly differing views, or who have made unpopular compromises, leads me to believe we will make the exact same mistakes again.
Spoiler
Specifically thinking of Delcy in Venezuela and the modern MPLA, but you could expand this to whatever - PSL, Trots, Maoists, Lula, Arab Socialism, American electoralist DemSocs. They may not be perfect, they may not be viable, they may not even be good, but they’re all part of the same struggle in my mind.
Except ACP obviously
In regards to Angola situation, China actually initially supported all three of them, providing support to FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA. The Chinese official position was that they were all “brotherly comrades” fighting for the same goal of Angolan liberation from Portuguese colonization. The Chinese even supported MPLA as early as 1958. These Chinese official position was that their role was only to help Angola become independent, and then let the Angolan people decide what kind of government they want after the fact, without interference from foreign powers.
This plan was disrupted when the Soviets declared MPLA the only legitimate revolutionary organization and then started heavily militarily backing them to take over all of Angola, which led to an outbreak of all-out civil war. The Chinese condemned this as interfering in Angola’s internal affairs, starting a very long bloody civil war, and believed that the Soviets were only doing this to establish a military presence in Angola to seize their resources. And thus the Chinese withdrew support from the MPLA around April 1974, but eventually withdrew support from both FNLA and UNITA as well in October 1975.
Chinese Marxists tend to have rather different views from Soviet Marxists. The latter tended to justify any intervention at all costs to spread socialism. The former tended to argue that socialism is something that must come from the bottom-up through grassroots movements, i.e. people have to want socialism, and that imposing it from the outside from the top-down can be rather counterproductive as people would then see socialism as an outside colonizing system to fight against if they want their own independence.
Some further examples are Yugoslavia and Poland. Chinese Marxist literature tends to be more critical of Soviet treatment of these countries, with the Soviets labeling Yugoslavia’s Autonomous Socialism as revisionist, and suppressing the Eighth Plenum of the Polish United Workers’ Party which advocated for socialism with Polish characteristics. Chinese Marxists argue that, whether or not these other models of socialism would succeed or fail, it is not the role of a foreign socialist power to decide that for them. Stalin even openly declared that “socialism with X characteristics” doesn’t even exist and is itself an anti-communist position, that there can only be one socialism and that is necessarily the Stalin Model.
In China’s Century of Humiliation they were subjugated brutally by foreign powers, and so they started to see the Soviet approach as a kind of imperialism. This was not unique to Mao or even Mao’s own analysis. Not all Chinese leadership agreed that the USSR had returned to capitalism. Indeed, even after Mao died, the anti-Soviet policies carried on, because what Chinese leadership generally agreed upon, regardless of whether or not the USSR was socialist or capitalist, is that their method of spreading revolution was expansionist ultimately for their own benefit of their own system and not out of a genuine desire to liberate the world.
If you honestly buy into the idea that the primary reason China was hostile to the USSR under Mao’s rule was because of Khrushchev’s economic “revisionism,” then you would predict that after Mao, they would become more friendly. But Deng Xiaoping’s administration maintained this exact same policy, describing Soviet influence in these bordering regions as: 中苏关系正常化三大障碍 (the three major obstacles to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations) often just shortened to 三大障碍 (the three major obstacles). The fear of Soviet expansion was a widespread fear and arguably much of Mao’s ideological justification for the split was really just a post-hoc justification for it.
The “three obstacles” referred to the fact that the Soviets had troops in Afghanistan on their western border, Mongolia on their northern border, and Vietnam on their southern border, and were basically surrounded. So, to understand why they’d make such a decision, you have to see it from the Chinese perspective: they just came out of being brutally oppressed over a century from expansionist powers, and they were surrounded at all sides by another power they started to see as expansionist, and so Chinese leadership started to see the USSR as an existential threat to their very existence. They then started to support anti-Soviet groups in these groups for that reason, to push out Soviet influence.
Khrushchev’s role was primarily his pulling out of the nuclear program with China. The USSR and China had been working together to research nuclear weapons such that China could become a nuclear power, but Khrushchev made a deal with the US which required, on the Soviet’s end of the bargain, to stop helping China build nukes. The USSR then pulled out of China, withdrew all their scientists, and even burned all the research and documents to try and prevent the Chinese from building nukes.
The “revisionism” was less about Khrushchev abandoning certain economic principles, but about him treating the Stalin Model as a dogmatic universal that should be enforced upon every country by force, and their own grassroots movements suppressed in order to do so. Stalin had expressed this to a degree but Khrushchev made it far worse to the point where the Chinese started to become very fearful of the USSR.
Chinese Marxists tend to have rather different views from Soviet Marxists. The latter tended to justify any intervention at all costs to spread socialism. The former tended to argue that socialism is something that must come from the bottom-up through grassroots movements, i.e. people have to want socialism, and that imposing it from the outside from the top-down can be rather counterproductive as people would then see socialism as an outside colonizing system to fight against if they want their own independence.
Lofty phrases with little substance. USSR did not invade capitalist countries to forcibly turn them socialist, it supported existing socialist and decolonial movements.
It requires incredible mental gymnastics to answer the question “why did China join USA to support reactionary jihadists, Pol Pot, and apartheid-aligned anti-communists against genuine socialist movements with broad popular support” with “because socialism must come from the bottom-up through grassroots movements”.
Soviets labeling Yugoslavia’s Autonomous Socialism as revisionist, and suppressing the Eighth Plenum of the Polish United Workers’ Party which advocated for socialism with Polish characteristics.
Soviets did not suppress the Eighth Plenum. They only demanded that Poland commits to remaining socialist, staying in the Warsaw Pact, and not expelling Soviet troops stationed in Poland (under condition they are not used to interfere in Poland’s internal affairs).
Plenum went forward with all their proposals. Soviet-aligned members of party leadership were removed and Gomułka, who was previously expelled from the party as a right-nationalist deviationist, was elected leader. Proposed measures to decentralise power and institute worker self-management went through. So your assertion that USSR enforced a rigid model on Poland is markedly false.
Gomułka very soon reversed those changes but those were internal Polish decisions because the party quickly realised it actually needs centralised power for the socialist project to survive - or because they lusted for power, whatever explanation works for you, what matters is there is zero evidence this reversal was forced by Moscow.
Please also remember Mao himself was as ideologically rigid as Stalin. You bring up Yugoslavia but Mao also condemned Tito and Yugoslavian worker self-management as revisionism. He condemned Khrushchev’s reforms as revisionism too - why not let USSR blaze their own path if imposing the Stalin Model from outside is so bad?
The “three obstacles” referred to the fact that the Soviets had troops in Afghanistan on their western border, Mongolia on their northern border, and Vietnam on their southern border, and were basically surrounded.
USSR only moved troops into Vietnam after China invaded Vietnam in response to Vietnam liberating Cambodia from Pol Pot.
USSR also had no troops in Afghanistan before the Afghan war - the one where China sided with the “brave freedom fighters” on their own border who would soon enough export extremism to Xinjiang and Chechnya; they would become Al-Qaeda, then ISIS, Jolani, the gift that keeps on giving to this day.
OP asked why China sided with Pol Pot and Mujahideen and you explain it by bringing up those same exact events and presenting them as Soviet encirclement.
The USSR and China had been working together to research nuclear weapons such that China could become a nuclear power, but Khrushchev made a deal with the US which required, on the Soviet’s end of the bargain, to stop helping China build nukes. The USSR then pulled out of China, withdrew all their scientists, and even burned all the research and documents to try and prevent the Chinese from building nukes.
Two falsehoods here:
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Khrushchev never made such deal with the US (or provide archival source, documents from this era are declassified and publicly available). Khrushchev withdrew support for Chinese nuclear program because Mao started shelling Taiwan and Khrushchev didn’t want to be dragged into a nuclear war with the USA.
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There was no burning of research and documents. In fact once the cat was out of the bag there was no putting it back. China simply continued their nuclear program without Soviet help.
Stalin had expressed this to a degree but Khrushchev made it far worse to the point where the Chinese started to become very fearful of the USSR.
Exactly the opposite is true. Post-Stalin USSR afforded Soviet Bloc countries greater ideological, political, and economic freedom, expanded its support to non-socialist decolonial movements, and supported the Non-Aligned Movement.
Overall a lot of this hinges on simply assuming that Mao’s paranoia about USSR had merits despite all archival evidence to the contrary.
Mao feared that Khrushchev is starting a capitalist restoration and wants to make a deal with the USA against China, and decided to do it first. However no declassified Soviet or US documents support this.
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These Chinese official position was that their role was only to help Angola become independent, and then let the Angolan people decide what kind of government they want after the fact, without interference from foreign powers.
at least imho, china sending arms to the apartheid and cia-supported savimbi gang very much counts as “interference from foreign powers”.
and there is zero proof that they “withdrew” any aid post-1975: this declassified document from 3 december 1975 records american-chinese discussions of aid to anti-communist forces, and this resource states that the carter administration (1977-1981!) brokered chinese arms sales to savimbi’s forces amounting to 800 tons of weapons.
The “three obstacles” referred to the fact that the Soviets had troops in Afghanistan on their western border, Mongolia on their northern border, and Vietnam on their southern border, and were basically surrounded.
as another commenter already helpfully pointed out, the ussr only moved troops into vietnam after china invaded. also, the soviets had every right to station troops in mongolia, as they were there by invitation of the mongolian government. china was also behaving aggressively, conducting illegal aggressions against the soviet union at damansky island and other locations, not to mention establishing extensive ties with the cia by helping them build anti-soviet espionage stations in northern china (project chestnut), with deng even receiving an exclusive tour of langley.
Stalin even openly declared that “socialism with X characteristics” doesn’t even exist and is itself an anti-communist position, that there can only be one socialism and that is necessarily the Stalin Model.
Curious where you are getting this part. Because it sounds almost like painting Stalin as egotistical and dogmatic about marxism.
I believe they are alluding to this quote
You speak of some kind of Sinified [Chinese-style] socialism; there is no such thing in nature. There is no Russian, English, French, German, Italian socialism, just as there is no Chinese socialism. There is only one Marxist-Leninist socialism. It is another matter that in building socialism it is absolutely necessary to take into account the specific features of a given country. But socialism is a science, which necessarily has, like any science, general laws, and if you deviate from them, the construction of socialism is doomed to inevitable failure.
From the 1949 meeting between Stalin and a delegation from the CPC.
I see. Maybe I am jumping to conclusions, but at a glance, it reads like a misunderstanding between Stalin and the delegation. Because my understanding of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is that it is intended to mean socialism with “the specific features of a given country” taken into account, not some kind of deviation from the science of it.
I think it makes more sense when you listen to Chairman Mao reflecting on Stalin in regards to China in 1956.
Stalin did a number of wrong things in connection with China. The “Left” adventurism pursued by Wang Ming in the latter part of the Second Revolutionary Civil War period and his Right opportunism in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan can both be traced to Stalin. At the time of the War of Liberation, Stalin first enjoined us not to press on with the revolution, maintaining that if civil war flared up, the Chinese nation would run the risk of destroying itself. Then when fighting did erupt, he took us half seriously, half sceptically. When we won the war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure on us was very strong indeed. Even so, we maintain the estimate of 30 per cent for his mistakes and 70 per cent for his achievements. This is only fair.
However Stalin was still held in the up most (utmost?) esteem, it remained understood that while there were contradictions present that the Soviet Union still held China as equal and sovereign (hence the outrage when the secret speech took place). It was only when Krushchev came to power those contradictions became the wedge that became the sino soviet split as Krushchev very clearly did not believe in Chinese sovereignty or equality.
Interesting, thanks for the context.
Stalin also called the export of revolution “nonsense” so I think the idea of the “Stalin model” being expansionist is more nuanced.
This is a divisive topic, so reminder to comrades to keep it civil and respectful.
Given the back and forth going on in the comments, I’d recommend reading some of the literature. With respect, some comrades appear to think that if they can win an argument in the market(-socialist)place of ideas that is Lemmygrad, material reality will adjust itself to accommodate their digital victory. As MLs, it is necessary to develop an actually dialectical understanding rather than defaulting to knee-jerk received assertions.
All these works are available through search on Z-Library, Anna’s Archive or Internet Archive.
On the Sino-Soviet relationship
Shen, Z. and Li, D. 2016. A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917-1991. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Borisov, O.B. and Koloskov B.T. 1975. Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1973: A Brief History. Progress Publishers Moscow.
Summary histories of Sino-Soviet relations from both perspectives. Keep in mind the Soviet book is rather dated.
Shen, Z. and Xia, Y. 2015. Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New History. Lexington.
Li, D. and Xia, Y. 2018. Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1973. Lexington.
History of the changing Sino-Soviet relationship from the Chinese perspective. One of the authors is a anti-Stalin anti-Mao Chinese liberal and this bleeds through (and explains why these books got English translations), but this nonetheless still makes the narrative more readable than the cottage industry of Sino-Russian history books that have cropped up since 2022 by third-wheel Western academics who explicitly write their works addressed to and to inform Western think tanks on how to break up the contemporary relationship.
On China’s Border Disputes
Maxwell, Neville. 1970. India’s China War. Jaico Publishing House.
Since there was a defense of Nehru’s India in the comments, I added this corrective. As the realpolitik position of the USSR had been to side with India in the matter, meaning historically, one strain of leftist thought has been to side against China’s case here. It should be also stated that the Sino-Indian War is the source of the CPI’s first split, where people like Charu Mazumdar (later founder of the Naxalite movement) opposed Nehru’s national chauvinist war. (For more on this, refer to D’Mello, Bernard. 2018. India After Naxalbari: Unfinished History. Monthly Review Press.)
Maxwell, Neville. 2014. China’s Borders: Settlements and Conflicts. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Same author, who interestingly enough, was originally a self-professed “pro-Nehru” scholar on India who got access to the Indian archives but was so shocked by what he uncovered on the Nehru government’s bumbling and malfeasant approach that led to the war that he pivoted to become a Chinese border conflict scholar instead. This is a short survey that assesses the Chinese border dispute approach covering the Sino-Indian, Sino-Soviet/Russian and Hong Kong disputes.
On General Chinese Foreign Policy
Hammond, Kenneth. 2025. China and the World. 1804 Books.
Published by 1804 Books and available on their site. There is no online copy that I could find but Hammond is a good comrade so it would be worth supporting their work. Note that some presently controversial PSL figures wrote a foreword/epilogue for this IIRC so bear that in mind.
On the Sino-Vietnamese War
Zhang, Xiaoming. 2015. Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991. The University of North Carolina Press.
This is a work commissioned by the US Air Force College for the purposes of studying China’s last fought war. It is therefore a very detached and utilitarian work which might jive against people looking for a more emotionally-charged narrative of this conflict. I would note that the author alleges there has been a general publication ban on the Sino-Vietnamese War by agreement of both the CPC and CPV, where both sides apparently agreed to not pour fuel over fire and let the wound from the war gradually heal over further generations. If true, this would an interesting position compared to the more grassroots fracas about this conflict driven by liberal Sino-Vietnamese nationalisms.
I would add one further note that, as MLs, it is fundamental to keep in mind that the overall purpose of socialist-minded critique is not to primarily re-litigate historical positions, harangue or castigate. It is to develop a nuanced understanding of past errors in order to recognize and prevent signs of their repetition.
ty for your recommendations
it is fundamental to keep in mind that the overall purpose of socialist-minded critique is not to primarily re-litigate historical positions, harangue or castigate. It is to develop a nuanced understanding of past errors in order to recognize and prevent signs of their repetition.
however, one shouldn’t just uncritically accept the narratives of the victorious side either. the amount of condescending smugness i’ve experienced from chinese people reacting to the suffering the ussrs collapse caused has been tiring.
Quite frankly, I don’t think there is a victor and I would not see those sort of assessments to be the correct approach to viewing things under a principled ML outlook. In terms of China, incidentally, I wrote about this just a few days ago.
I would just say that, anecdotally, there are many Chinese people I’ve spoken to whom are completely socialism-agnostic liberal nationalists and whom I’d imagine would be quite pleased if a zombie Chiang Kai-Shek arose to topple the CPC so long as they could reclaim Outer Manchuria (which since 2022 has been a pet topic of individuals in China - or who claim to be Chinese - interested in any way possible to implode the modern Sino-Russian relationship for the US’ benefit). However, I would keep in mind as always when talking about people from China (or India for that matter) is that every one in five people on this planet are Chinese and you would be able to find opinions and repulsive positions of all stripes which you could take offense at from a population that vast. It’s not a matter of turning the other cheek but gently resisting that compulsion to make blanket assumptions.
Returning to the topic, I’d say that the lesson from the “end of history” is that history never ends. The victory of the October Revolution led to the counter-revolution in 1991. The American unipolar moment ended up being quite ephemeral. If someone like Li Qiang became Xi’s successor and Gorbachev’d China, you could say the same thing about 1949.
In Germany, there was great resentment towards Gorbachev’s USSR for having sold out the country to Kohl. There’s also been a never ending amount of people over the generations of the DDR who claimed that, if only Stalin didn’t “steal away” our industrial base as reparations, the country would have never been placed at such a disadvantage compared to the West. It’s tiring to hear and substantively unproductive. The more useful thing for us is tireless vigilance and not score-keeping.
good take, ty ! <3
Thanks, I really appreciate the recommendations. Genuinely.
If anyone else has recommendations of books they’ve read, I’d appreciate it as well.
I’ll try to answer all 3:
- Sino-Soviet split (Vietnam was aligned with the USSR)
- Sino-Soviet split (Afghanistan was aligned with the USSR)
- (drum roll) yeah it’s Sino-Soviet split too (Angola and Cuba were aligned with the USSR)
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Vietnam was keeping supplies intended for the Rouge for itself during the vietnam war, kicked out its chinese minority, was making noise on the back then informal China-Vietnam border, sided with the soviets during the split(Vietnam didn’t really have a choice), upheld the claims of South Vietnam on the SCS after unification and invaded Cambodia (Vietnam already knew of the genocides of the Rouge, China didn’t). To China it looked as if they had a growing Vietnamese empire to their south allied to the now hostile USSR to their north. The PRC needed a counter weight. Ultimately China settled staying in a border war with Vietnam until the 80s to fuck them economically, it was shitshow for both sides. Both communist parties have mended ties only recently and the vietnamese people are still pissed.
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Sino-Soviet-Split.
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Sino-Soviet-Split
I am a bit suspicious of the slanted portrayal of Vietnam (could you provide sources); the positive portrayal of China is also suspicious to me.
Sorry, I came to those conclusions at various points. Deng was pretty open why he was pissed with Vietnam, for example. I think in the interview he did with that anglo reporter he said it at some point.
As for the SCS stuff, you can go digging when that pub brawl began. Been a while since I did it.
And most importantly: When two former long-time close allies end up at war with each other and one side claims to be completely without fault (Vietnams line), that’s suspicious. That’s war propaganda 101 “we are without fault, our enemy attacked without reason!”
a growing Vietnamese empire
😂
Chinas opinion not mine.
Removed by mod
Keep it civil please, this is a divisive topic and remember to be respectful to comrades.
sorry. i’ll try to do better in the future.
No probs, thank u!
Bud I explained Chinas opinion. To the PRC it initally looked like a expanding Vietnam to their south allied to the USSR to their north. Both opposed to China via their positioning in the Split. China was wrong regarding its analysis regarding the invasion of Cambodia. Take your personal attacks somewhere else.
all this simply because china wanted to be the top bully in service of their buddies in the united states and thus couldn’t tolerate a strong and independent neighbour.
Ironically what you wrote is the Vietnamese propaganda on the matter. Which unmasked as obvious bullshit once you remember how much China aided the Vietminh against the french and yanks. Easy example: Chinese versions of the AK were directly handed to Vietnam, the PLA got theirs years later. Definitely something someone wanting to be the top bully who could not tolerate a strong and independent neighbour would do!
I explained the things Vietnam fucked up. China had some valid reasons for its actions, as did Vietnam. But both also fucked up hard at various points. Thus culminated in the shitshow that was the invasion. I have no idea who fucked up more before that, so do not try to believe I said both did equally, please.
But the idea that Vietnam was some innocent chungus holy country that did nothing wrong is unmaterialistic thinking. Before sopcialist nations are socialist, they are nations.
the united states has shared military technologies much more advanced than assault rifles with all sorts of countries. does that mean that washington has no intention of being the top bully and is willing to tolerate a strong and independent neighbour?
also, it is rather strange of you to criticise me for being insufficiently critical of the vietnamese narrative, while portraying beijing’s claims of “vietnamese empire building” as if they were valid concerns and not obvious smoke and mirrors to drum up justification for the war. imperialism requires a capitalist economy, which vietnam did not possess, and also it did not export capital and was not under the control of a financial oligarchy.
vietnam was not a threat to china in any meaningful way; simple economic, military and demographic statistics show as much. and simultaneously, china at the time was rather reluctant to antagonise american hegemony and actual imperialism…
that vietnam was soviet-aligned after the sino-soviet split meant that china was concerned it was about to be totally surrounded by soviet-aligned countries. the issue was not a “vietnamese empire”, the issue was the sino-soviet split. these are some of the most complex issues of the 20th century, and framing it as a simple issue of “bullying” is reductionist moralism.
please explain what supposed military threat the prc was experiencing from vietnam?
the entire soviet bloc?
you’re sounding like a reaganite.
there was no “soviet bloc” as such. while there were many pro-soviet governments around the world, this was due to the ussr supporting anti-colonial movements and socialist revolutions worldwide, in turn leading to states wrongly dubbed “soviet satellites” by western and chinese propaganda. meanwhile, the only allies willing to fight for the prc were reactionary clanists like siyaad barre, compradores like jonas savimbi, misogynist drug barons such as gulbeddin hekmatyar, and monsters like pol pot.
your view relies solely on uncritically accepting chinese leadership’s claims about the ussr, despite all no evidence supporting them.
also, you didn’t answer my question:
what supposed military threat the prc was experiencing from vietnam?
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China’s actual policy, regardless of what the party may think or feel is one of survival and bettering the conditions of the Chinese people at any cost. It’s that simple. Internationalism is dead. Maybe one day it can be revived but for now it’s every socialist project for itself.










