• 10 Posts
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Joined 8 months ago
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Cake day: March 23rd, 2026

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  • No, it’s not one file with two decryption keys — you’ve got the architecture slightly wrong. There’s one storage, encrypted with AES-256-GCM. The PIN doesn’t decrypt the file — it’s verified at the application level. If the real PIN matches, the real environment loads. If the decoy PIN matches, the decoy environment loads with its own data, stored in the same storage under separate keys. Two layers of data in one container, not two containers with different keys.




  • Good points, but the architecture is a bit different. It’s not two separate encrypted files — from the outside there’s no indication there are two PINs at all. The decoy environment looks like a fully functional account: its own chats, groups, contacts, message history. The attacker doesn’t know there’s a second layer because nothing tells them the first layer is a decoy.

    Your approach of generating a random DB for any wrong PIN is interesting too, but it has a different problem: there’s no “correct” result, any PIN “works”, and a paranoid attacker can figure that out. Here the decoy environment is convincing precisely because it’s a real-looking account, not a placeholder.

    On encryption: AES-256-GCM, keys derived via HKDF-SHA256 with salt. The code is fully open source on GitHub — that is the documentation. Separate security docs don’t make sense for me to write right now, but if the project grows — definitely yes.






  • Messages are stored on the server only until the recipient comes online. Once they connect, a 30-second timer starts — after that the message is permanently deleted from the server. There’s no copy left server-side after that point. Since private chats use E2EE, the server only ever sees ciphertext anyway. After delivery, messages exist only locally on both devices. If you want no local record either, you can delete the conversation manually from within the app.