Cryptography nerd

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Joined 11 months ago
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Cake day: August 16th, 2023

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  • A lot of this doesn’t work easily on the activitypub model, because accounts and posts and communities live on their host instances, and every interaction has to be relayed to them and updates have to be retrieved from them.

    While you can set up mirrors with arbitrary additional moderation that can be seen from everywhere, you can’t support submission of content from instances blocked by the host instance.

    The bluesky model with content addressing can create that experience by allowing the creation of “roaming” communities where posts and comments can be collected by multiple hosts who each can apply their own filtering. Since posts are signed and comment trees use hashes of the parent you can’t manipulate others’ posts undetected.

    Bluesky already has 3rd party moderation label services and 3rd party feed generators for its Twitter-like service, and a fork replicating a forum model could have 3rd party forum views and 3rd party moderation applied similarly.



  • You must use your home instance as a proxy.

    If you find a post elsewhere you have to take its URL and put it into your own instance’s search function, and it will recognize it as a post on another lemmy instance and retrieve it for you.

    You can also use search from your instance to go looking for things outside your instance which it already knows about.

    Mastodon has made this easier by asking what your home instance is when you try to interact with a post on their domain without being logged in, and then it redirects you to a view of that same post from your own instance. Lemmy could do the same.











  • Pushing a route also means that the network traffic will be sent over the same interface as the DHCP server instead of the virtual network interface. This is intended functionality that isn’t clearly stated in the RFC. Therefore, for the routes we push, it is never encrypted by the VPN’s virtual interface but instead transmitted by the network interface that is talking to the DHCP server. As an attacker, we can select which IP addresses go over the tunnel and which addresses go over the network interface talking to our DHCP server.

    Ok, so double encrypted and authenticated traffic (TLS inside the VPN) would still be safe, and some stuff requiring an internal network origin via the VPN is safe (because the attacker can’t break into the VPN connection and your client won’t get the right response), but a ton of other traffic is exposed (especially unencrypted internal traffic on corporate networks, especially if it’s also reachable without a VPN or if anything sends credentials in plaintext)