Apple quietly introduced code into iOS 18.1 which reboots the device if it has not been unlocked for a period of time, reverting it to a state which improves the security of iPhones overall and is making it harder for police to break into the devices, according to multiple iPhone security experts.

On Thursday, 404 Media reported that law enforcement officials were freaking out that iPhones which had been stored for examination were mysteriously rebooting themselves. At the time the cause was unclear, with the officials only able to speculate why they were being locked out of the devices. Now a day later, the potential reason why is coming into view.

“Apple indeed added a feature called ‘inactivity reboot’ in iOS 18.1.,” Dr.-Ing. Jiska Classen, a research group leader at the Hasso Plattner Institute, tweeted after 404 Media published on Thursday along with screenshots that they presented as the relevant pieces of code.

  • NateNate60@lemmy.world
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    5 days ago

    Law enforcement shouldn’t be able to get into someone’s mobile phone without a warrant anyway. All this change does is frustrate attempts by police to evade going through the proper legal procedures and abridging the rights of the accused.

    • catloaf@lemm.ee
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      5 days ago

      It does not. I don’t have it on my Pixel 6. From other people’s comments, it sounds like Samsung and other OEMs have added their version, though.

      • ben@lemmy.zip
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        5 days ago

        Yeah, can confirm Samsung has this. I have auto reboot configured.

    • rockSlayer@lemmy.world
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      5 days ago

      That seals the deal for me on rooting my pixel. I’ve been hesitant about rooting ever since I bricked an extra galaxy s3 and nearly bricked my (main device) Verizon galaxy s5

      • iturnedintoanewt@lemm.ee
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        5 days ago

        GrapheneOS is the easiest ROM install bar none. Get the en browser (needs to be chrome-based) to the install url, hook the phone cable, and let it run. It’s super straightforward. It’s not rooting though, you don’t get root access by default.

        • rockSlayer@lemmy.world
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          5 days ago

          Wow things sure changed about Android roms! I still remember how difficult it was to try to simply install a rom through Knox

  • Teknikal@eviltoast.org
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    4 days ago

    I think this used to be possible with tasker, ironically though probably not anymore before of all Google’s restrictions on Android. (maybe if you have root)

    • TaviRider@reddthat.com
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      4 days ago

      When you first boot up a device, most data on that device is encrypted. This is the Before First Unlock (BFU) state. In order to access any of that data, someone must enter the passcode. The Secure Enclave uses it to recreate the decryption keys that allow the device to access that encrypted data. Biometrics like Face ID and Touch ID won’t work: they can’t be used to recreate the encryption keys.

      Once you unlock the device by entering the passcode the device generates the encryption keys and uses them to access the data. It keeps those keys in memory. If it didn’t, you’d have to enter your passcode over and over again in order to keep using your device. This is After First Unlock (AFU) state.

      When you’re in AFU state and you lock your device, it doesn’t throw away the encryption keys. It just doesn’t permit you to access your device. This is when you can use biometrics to unlock it.

      In some jurisdictions a judge can legally force someone to enter biometrics, but can’t force them give up their passcode. This legal distinction in the USA is that giving a passcode is “testimonial” because it requires giving over the contents of your mind, and forcing suspects to do that is not legal in the USA. Biometrics aren’t testimonial, and so someone can be forced to use them, similar to how arrested people are forced to give fingerprints.

      Of course, in practical terms this is a meaningless distinction because both biometrics and a passcode can grant access to nearly all data on a device. So one interesting thing about BFU vs AFU is that BFU makes this legal hair-splitting moot: biometrics don’t work in BFU state.

      But that’s not what the 404 Media articles are about. It’s more about the forensic tools that can sometimes extract data even from a locked device. A device in AFU state has lots of opportunities for attack compared to BFU. The encryption keys exist, some data is already decrypted in memory, the lightning port is active, it will connect to Wi-Fi networks, and so on. This constitutes a lot of attack surface that hackers could potentially exploit to pull data off the device. In BFU state, there’s very little data available and almost no attack surface. Automatically returning a device to BFU state improves resistance to hacking.

      • tupalos@lemmy.world
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        2 days ago

        Great explanation. That was super insightful.

        So even with BFU, does the iPhone not connect to the internet? I guess i hadn’t noticed it doesn’t.

        Also are you still about to track via gps an iPhone that is in the off state? Just curious if there’s a lot of other vectors where the iPhone is still connected?

        • TaviRider@reddthat.com
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          2 days ago

          So even with BFU, does the iPhone not connect to the internet? I guess i hadn’t noticed it doesn’t.

          Well, it’s complicated. Most of these topics are. In BFU state, an iPhone (or iPad with cellular) with an active SIM and active data plan will connect to the Internet. It won’t connect to Wi-Fi at all. If you have USB restricted mode disabled and the right accessory connected it will connect to an Ethernet network, but that may fail if the network requires 802.1x and the credential is not available in BFU state. Similarly if USB restricted mode is disabled you can use tethering to a Mac to share its network.

          For location, there’s two mechanisms. One mechanism relies on directly communicating with the device, which only works if the device has network.

          The other mechanism is the “FindMy network” which uses a Bluetooth low energy (BTLE) beacon to let other nearby devices detect it, and they report that to FindMy. It’s a great technology. The way it uses rotating IDs preserves your privacy while still letting you locate your devices. I know that this works when a device is powered off but the battery is not completely dead. I’m not sure if it works in BFU state… my guess it that it does work. But this is not networking. It’s just a tiny Bluetooth signal broadcasting a rotating ID, so it’s one-way communication.

          Other than that, I’m not as sure how things work. I believe Bluetooth is disabled by default in BFU state, but I suspect users can choose to re-enable Bluetooth in BFU state to connect to accessibility accessories. I’m not sure about the new emergency satellite communication.

          But one thing I know for sure is that Apple has world class security engineers, and one area they work hard to secure is devices in BFU state.

          • tupalos@lemmy.world
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            1 day ago

            Wow ya that’s a lot of stuff to have to keep track of. Those security engineers are something else. I thought software security was already complex but iPhones or any phones sounds like its even more so

      • Excrubulent@slrpnk.net
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        4 days ago

        Fun fact: in Australia we don’t have a bill of rights of any kind, so the cops can just force you to reveal your passwords. The maximum penalty for refusing is 2 years imprisonment.

    • nicerdicer@feddit.org
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      4 days ago

      Once rebooted, you need to enter your PIN to unlock the phone (and the SIM as well). Before that it is not possible to unlock the phone with biometric credentials (face ID or fingerprint).

      As far as I’m aware, police can force you to hand over your biometric credentials (they can hold the phone to your face to unlock it when you have face ID enabled, or can move your finger to the fingerprint sensor). But they can’t force you to reveal the PIN number.